

A


Handwritten mark resembling a stylized 'M' or 'A' with a diagonal line through it.

06/34/

SECRET

FRP: 2581

STATE



81 7180708

SSO

PAGE 001

NC 7180708

TOP: 260020Z SEP 81

OO RUEAIIB
ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHC #7114 2682029
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 251937Z SEP 81 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0000
RUEFMC/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
BT
S E C R E T STATE 257114
EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 9/24/01 (GOMPERT, DAVID C.)

Handwritten notes: "Rtn DG" and "copy BF" with arrows pointing to the right.

Vertical stamp: "RECEIVED" with a date "SEP 21 1981".

TAGS: MNUC, TNF, NATO, UR

SUBJECT: US-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT ON TNF NEGOTIA-
TIONS: BRIEFING THE ALLIES

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. NOW THAT WE AND SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO BEGIN TNF
NEGOTIATIONS ON NOVEMBER 30 IN GENEVA, WE THOUGHT ALLIES
WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE DETAILS OF THE PROCESS THAT LED
TO THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED SEPTEMBER 24.

3. YOU SHOULD DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS AND DRAFT TEXTS
(WHICH MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE) IN BRIEFING SCG EPS:
- WE BROACHED THE SUBJECT OF A JOINT STATEMENT TO FOLLOW
THE HAIG-GROMYKO DISCUSSIONS AS EARLY AS THE FIRST
EAGLEBURGER-BESSMERTNYKH MEETING ON TNF ON JUNE 10. AS
YOU KNOW, OUR PURPOSE IN SUGGESTING SUCH A STATEMENT WAS
TO DEMONSTRATE PUBLICLY THAT BOTH SIDES WERE PREPARED TO
GET DOWN TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON TNF ARMS CONTROL AND
THAT THERE WAS, FROM THE START, A MODICUM OF AGREEMENT

State Dept. review completed

SECRET

SECRET

STATE

81 7180708 SSO

PAGE 002

NC 7180708

TOP: 260020Z SEP 81

BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, OF COURSE, WE HAD TO PROTECT OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION FULLY AND GUARD AGAINST ANY SOVIET EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A RECORD SUPPORTING THEIR APPROACH. WE OF COURSE AT NO TIME ENGAGED IN ANYTHING THAT COULD BE CALLED SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATION, SINCE DOING SO WOULD HAVE SHORT-CIRCUITED THE PROCESS OF THOROUGH STUDY AND CONSULTATION LAUNCHED AT ROME.

-- THE INITIAL EAGLEBURGER-BESSMER-TNYKH MEETINGS FOCUSED ON REACHING AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON A TIME AND PLACE FOR BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE SEPTEMBER 11 MEETING THE U.S. PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING TEXT FOR A JOINT STATEMENT:

BEGIN TEXT AT THEIR MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 23, 1981, THE US SECRETARY OF STATE, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, AND THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, ANDREY A. GROMYKO, EXCHANGED VIEWS REGARDING ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING WHAT THE US TERMS "THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES" AND THE USSR TERMS "MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS". THEY AGREED ON THE NEED TO PURSUE SERIOUS NEGOTIATION ON SUCH FORCES, WITHIN THE SALT FRAMEWORK, WITH THE AIM OF ARRIVING AT EQUAL, EFFECTIVE, AND VERIFIABLE LIMITATIONS AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL, IN THE INTEREST OF ENHANCING STABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

ACCORDINGLY, THE MINISTERS AGREED ON BEHALF OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO BEGIN US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON SUCH FORCES ON NOVEMBER 30 IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND. BOTH SIDES WILL BE REPRESENTED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS WITH AMBASSADORIAL RANK: (BLANK) FOR THE US AND (BLANK) FOR THE USSR.

THE MINISTERS AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND PLEDGE TO SPARE NO EFFORT TO REACH AN EQUITABLE AND MEANINGFUL OUTCOME. END TEXT

-- IN HANDING OVER THIS TEXT, WE EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAD NO INTENT OF NEGOTIATING ON SUBSTANCE THROUGH THIS STATEMENT. THE POINTS WE INCLUDED BEYOND DATE AND PLACE REFLECTED WHAT WE HOPED WOULD BE COMMON BROAD GOALS.

SECRET

SECRET

STATE

81 7180708 SSO

PAGE 003

NC 7180708

TOR: 260020Z SEP 81

-- ON SEPTEMBER 14 THE SOVIETS CAME BACK TO US WITH THEIR COUNTER-PROPOSAL, WHICH READ:

BEGIN TEXT AT THEIR MEETING (MEETINGS) ON SEPTEMBER 23 (AND 28), 1981, THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTER, ANDREY A. GROMYKO, AND THE US SECRETARY OF STATE, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, EXCHANGED VIEWS REGARDING ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING RELEVANT NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE WHICH HAVE FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SIDES.

THEY AGREED ON THE NEED TO PURSUE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON SUCH ARMS AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS AGREED TO BEGIN THESE NEGOTIATIONS ON NOVEMBER 30 IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND. THE SOVIET SIDE WILL BE REPRESENTED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS BY A DELEGATION HEADED BY AMBASSADOR (BLANK) AND THE US SIDE - BY A DELEGATION HEADED BY AMBASSADOR (BLANK).

BOTH SIDES BELIEVE IN THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS FOR ENHANCING STABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND PLEDGED TO SPARE NO EFFORT TO REACH AN EQUITABLE AND MEANINGFUL OUTCOME ON THE BASIS OF PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES. END TEXT

-- IN HANDING OVER THIS COUNTER-PROPOSAL, BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT THE TIMING OF RELEASE OF THE STATEMENT SHOULD DEPEND ON THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST HAIG-GROMYKO MEETING. WE HAD EARLIER PROPOSED THAT DISCUSSION OF TNF BE CONFINED TO THE FIRST MEETING, WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO ISSUE THE STATEMENT IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER.

-- WE NOTED AT THIS SEPTEMBER 14 MEETING THAT THE SOVIET TEXT APPEARED TO RAISE SEVERAL SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE ALSO QUESTIONED WHETHER THEIR OMISSION OF OUR CRITERIA FOR AN AGREEMENT -- EQUAL, EFFECTIVE, VERIFIABLE, LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL -- MEANT THAT THEY DID NOT SHARE THESE GOALS.

-- ON SEPTEMBER 18 WE PRESENTED THE SOVIETS WITH A FURTHER DRAFT:

SECRET

SECRET

STATE

81 7180708 SSO

PAGE 004

NC 7180708

TOP: 260020Z SEP 81

BEGIN TEXT AT THEIR MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 23, 1981, THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, AND THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTER, ANDREY A. GROMYKO, EXCHANGED VIEWS REGARDING CONTROL OF THEATER NUCLEAR ARMS. THEY AGREED ON THE NEED TO PURSUE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON SUCH ARMS AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS AGREED TO BEGIN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NOVEMBER 30 IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

THE U.S. SIDE WILL BE REPRESENTED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS BY A DELEGATION HEADED BY AMBASSADOR (BLANK) AND THE SOVIET SIDE BY A DELEGATION HEADED BY AMBASSADOR (BLANK).

THE TWO SIDES AGREE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS FOR ENHANCING STABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. THEY PLEDGE TO SPARE NO EFFORT TO REACH AN EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE, AND MEANINGFUL OUTCOME AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF FORCES. END TEXT

-- AS YOU WILL RECOGNIZE, WE ATTEMPTED IN THIS DRAFT TO ACCOMMODATE SOVIET DIFFICULTIES IN REGARD TO THE TWO MAJOR OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES: THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THEIR GOAL.

-- WE BELIEVED THAT "CONTROL OF THEATER NUCLEAR ARMS" WAS A REASONABLE AND NON-PREJUDICIAL COMPROMISE ON THE FIRST POINT. ON THE SECOND WE RETAINED THE WORD EQUITABLE FROM THE SOVIET DRAFT, AS A TERM THAT COULD ENCOMPASS BOTH POINTS OF VIEW.

-- HOWEVER, WE DID NOT DROP THE PHRASE "LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF FORCES," SINCE WE BELIEVED THAT THIS BASIC GOAL SHOULD BE CLEARLY PUT ON THE RECORD. NOR WERE WE PREPARED TO COMPROMISE ON OUR BELIEF THAT AN EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE VERIFIABLE.

-- IN DISCUSSING THIS NEW TEXT, RESSMERTNYKH SHOWED LITTLE OR NO FLEXIBILITY. RATHER THAN SEARCHING FOR NEW FORMULAS, HE KEPT ON RETURNING TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE SOVIET COUNTER-PROPOSAL OF SEPTEMBER 14.

SECRET

SECRET

STATE

81 7180708 SSO

PAGE 005

NC 7180708

TOR: 260020Z SEP 81

-- IN ARRIVING AT THE FINAL TEXT, WHICH ALL ALLIES WILL HAVE SEEN, IT PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE ON HOW TO CHARACTERIZE THE AGREEMENT TO BE SOUGHT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIETS WERE ESPECIALLY RESISTANT TO ANY REFERENCE TO VERIFIABILITY.

-- IN AGREEING TO THE FORMULATION ON WHAT TO CALL THE SYSTEMS, SECRETARY HAIG MADE CLEAR TO GROMYKO THAT THIS IN NO WAY CONSTRAINS EITHER SIDE FROM RAISING SYSTEMS THAT MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED LAST YEAR IN GENEVA.

-- WHILE WE WOULD NOT WANT TO REACH FIRM CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE APPROACH THE SOVIETS WILL TAKE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THESE PREPARATORY CONTACTS, WE DO THINK SEVERAL POINTS ARE WORTH NOTING:

- SOVIET REFUSAL TO REFER TO LIMITATIONS AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL AS A COMMON GOAL.

- SOVIET REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A REFERENCE TO EQUALITY WITHOUT REFERRING TO EQUAL SECURITY, THEIR CODE WORD FOR INCLUSION OF OR COMPENSATION FOR ALLIED SYSTEMS.

- SOVIET REFUSAL TO SUBSCRIBE TO VERIFIABILITY AS A BASIC CRITERION.

- WE BELIEVE THAT SOVIET REFUSAL TO ACCEPT REFERENCES TO EQUALITY, VERIFIABILITY, AND LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL REPRESENT, ALONG WITH THEIR INSISTENCE ON NON-GLOBAL SCOPE, MAJOR VULNERABILITIES IN THE SOVIET APPROACH. WE INTEND TO KEEP PUBLIC ATTENTION RIVETTED ON THESE DEFECTS AS WE HEAD INTO NEGOTIATIONS. WE URGE ALLIES TO DO LIKEWISE.

-- WE ALSO FIND NOTEWORTHY THAT THE SOVIETS REFUSED TO ACCEPT A REFERENCE TO THE SALT FRAMEWORK, ARGUING THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO DEFINE A TNF-SALT LINK. LAST YEAR THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THAT A TNF AGREEMENT COULD NOT ENTER INTO FORCE UNTIL SALT II WAS RATIFIED. HAIG

Yes

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET